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Abstract 
It is becoming increasingly harder to protect devices against security threats; as 
malware is steadily evolving defence mechanisms are struggling to persevere. This 
study introduces a concept intended at supporting security systems using Self-
Organizing Incremental Neural Network (SOINN) and binary visualization. The system 
converts a file to its visual representation and sends the data for classification to 
SOINN. Tests were done to evaluate its performance and obtain an accuracy rate, 
which rounds the 80% figures at the moment, and false positive and negative rates. 
Bytes prevalence were also analysed with malware samples having a higher amount 
of null bytes compared with software samples, which may be a result of hiding 
malicious data or functionality. The patterns created by the samples were examined; 
malware samples had more clustering and created different patterns across the 
images whereas software samples presented mostly static and constant images 
although exceptions were noted in both categories. 
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Introduction 
With the constant evolution of malware techniques and the increasing number of 
devices infected the arms race between malware writers and security analysts is 
escalating. The majority of antimalware mechanisms adopt a signature-based 
approach (Moser, et al., 2008) and need to be aware of new malware and their source 
code in order to update its database with the malicious signature. This process relies 
on manually analysing a binary file, without executing it, allowing the analyst to 
understand in detail the behaviour of a sample, such as function calls, detect packers, 
find strings, – for instance if a program accesses a URL then a string will be created 
for the URL – and observe operations using the disassembled version, however 
reverse engineering code to obtain the malware signature is extremely time-
consuming and challenging for security defenders (Jilcott, 2015), thus the need for 
automated analysis.  
One method to automate the analysis process consists in running the binary in a virtual 
environment, where its interactions with the system, for e.g. API calls and registry 
changes, will determine if the program is malicious or not. This process provides a 
level of security to the system; as the malware is analysed in an isolated environment 
if any change is made by the binary it will only be reflected in the virtual machine image 
which can be replaced with a newer one after the analysis. However this automation 
method, also designated as dynamic analysis, has its shortcomings being them the 
insufficient information regarding the program’s functionality in some scenarios (Conti, 
et al., 2008), affecting the system performance as it is necessary to run the malware 
for an extend amount of time with limited resources or even the use of detection 
routines within the code (Katangur, et al., 2013). These routines detect whether the 
binary is being executed in a virtual environment, in which case the malicious actions 
will not be performed.  
In addition to that, malware writers are constantly exploring advanced attacking 
techniques such as polymorphism and metamorphism, and this has been proved 
successful while evading signature-based systems (Christodorescu & Jha 2003, 
Moser, et al., 2008). Polymorphic malware constantly mutates its appearance to avoid 
detection by anti-malware programs; the change may be done by modifying attributes 
such as filename or randomly generating a new key to encrypt the code but without 
affecting the functionality of the malicious code. Metamorphic malware is another form 
of polymorphism with the difference of auto-mutating its code and generating a 
somewhat different instance of itself with each execution becoming harder to detect 
but also harder to create.  
In face of those issues research is now focusing on machine learning. Yoo, 2004 uses 
Self-Organizing Maps (SOM) to flag unusual patterns in executables files particular to 
malware with the pattern position reflecting the position of the malicious code in the 
file. Chouchane, et al., 2008 base their research on that a good number of malicious 
programs are variations of previously identified malware and apply Hidden Markov 
Models to verify if a program may be a variant from some previous software, the 
framework predicts the effects of morphing actions on a particular property of a 
program being evaluated. Dahl, et al., 2013 presents a large-scale malware 
classification system using neural networks; the system utilizes random projections to 
decrease the input dimensionality. Gavrilut, et al., 2009 proposes a machine learning 
framework to discern malware and clean files. Xu, et al., 2017 centre their research in 
behaviour analysis, specifically the fingerprints left on the program memory access, 
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and employ machine learning to classify malicious behaviour. Firdausi, et al., 2010 
propose a method to tackle the ineffectiveness of static malware analysis against the 
rapid spread of malware using automatic analysis and data mining techniques. The 
solution compares 5 machine learning algorithms with the best performance being 
achieved by J48 with an accuracy rate of 96.8%. 
The purpose of this study is to present and evaluate a malware detection system 
based on machine learning to address the problems of the current security 
mechanisms, mainly detection of zero day exploits. The system employs binary 
visualization and the Self-Organizing Incremental Neural Network (SOINN) to 
distinguish malware from software. Binary visualization was used in the pre-
processing part of the system to identify potential anomalies in a file. Malin, et al. 
(2012) explain that by visualising the contents of a file it is possible to gather 
information about the data distribution on that file, identify data obfuscation and group 
similar files based on their binary patterns. This technique converts the binary values 
of a file to its two-dimensional representation. However, to maintain the proximity 
between points the two-dimensional plane was constructed with a Hilbert space-filling 
curve. Considering a two-dimensional square grid 𝑁	×	𝑁 where 𝑁 ≡ 2& and 𝑛 ≥ 0, a 
space-filling curve (SPC) is a continuous curve that passes through 𝑁* cells in the 
dimensional space without ever intercepting itself. Some algorithms need to perform 
calculations between neighbouring points, therefore preserving the data locality 
becomes essential when traversing the data (Gotsman & Lindenbaum, 1996), and in 
these contexts SPC are extremely useful. Among them the Hilbert curve is believed to 
achieve the best locality preservation (Jagadish 1990, Moon, et al. 2001, Lawder & 
King, 2001) and was used for clustering in this research.  
With regards machine learning SOINN, an unsupervised neural network used to 
classify data without previous knowledge of its network structure (Shen & Hasegawa, 
2006),	was used as the analysis and detection mechanism. It has no predefined 
topology and adjusts its structure to account for new input and delete noise becoming 
a simple yet powerful algorithm which has been adapted and used in various fields, 
including computer vision, anomaly detection, pattern classification and many others 
(Qiu, et al., 2016). 
Methodology 
Binary file visualisation using Binvis.io 
The system was constructed based on the online tool binvis.io (Cortesi, 2016), which 
uses images and the RBG plot to visualise binaries from files. The files were firstly 
converted to a string containing their binary code as each character of the string would 
later be used to create the image. The characters were picked one by one and 
converted to their appropriate colour. The process of colour selection was done by 
comparing the values in the ASCII table (figure 1) to their equivalent in the colour 
scheme provided in binvis.io (Cortesi, 2016) (figure 3). 
The values in the colour schemes (figure 3) have been divided in 5 groups: 
• Black = 0 or 0x00 
• Green = Low bytes 
• Blue = ASCII text 
• Red = High bytes (Extended ASCII) 
• White = 255 or 0xFF 
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Figure 1: ASCII Table (ASCII, no date) 
 
With this information, it is possible to assume what data different files may transport, 
i.e. the resulting image from a text file will mainly be composed by blue pixels whereas 
a compressed file will mostly likely display random colours.  
The data clustering was performed using the Hilbert curve to ensure data that is close 
together remains grouped once the image processing finishes. Figure 2 presents the 
same file clustered using Hilbert curves and simple curves. 
The byte colour is then draw on the image according to the coordinates given by the 
Hilbert curve. Since space-filling curves are made of squares, to obtain a rectangular 
shape the image height is subdivided in four creating squares stacked on top of each 
other. The squares are represented by their capacity which is the amount of data they 
can hold. To account for files that are larger than the capacity of the 4 squares 
previously introduced it is necessary to skip characters along the string. The flowchart 
used to create a binary image can be seen on figure 4. 
The final output is an image representing the features, data type of a file.  
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Figure 4: Binvis.io flowchart 
 
Image pre-processing 
Before sending the image representation of a file to SOINN it was necessary to 
normalise the data. Normalisation or pre-processing reduced redundancy, highlighted 
features and improved performance. 
Firstly, it was necessary that all images had the same resolution. Differences on input 
could influence and decrease the reliability of the algorithm as an image would be 
transporting more data than another. 
Figure 3: Binvis.io colour scheme. Tab (09), 
newline (0a) and carriage return (0d) are 
considered to be text (Cortesi, 2016). 
Figure 2: Hilbert curve clustering (a). The 
second clustering mechanism was the simple 
scan (b) which is more intuitive when 
navigating through data. The Hilbert curve on 
the other hand provides structural features 
which could remain unseen or difficult to 
evaluate otherwise. 
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The scale or resizing of the images was done using a variation of the nearest 
neighbour algorithm. For an input sample, the output or class was computed by finding 
the closest match/sample in the training data. The process was similar when scaling 
an image. If an image needed to be enlarged, empty spaces were appended to the 
picture (Tech-Algorithm.com, 2007) and coloured using the nearest neighbour 
method. The algorithm finds which pixel is nearest to an empty space and fills this 
space with the pixel colour. Figure 5 illustrates a binary representation of a file before 
(5a) and after (5b) being resized using the nearest neighbour algorithm. 
	
Figure 5: Using the nearest neighbour algorithm to rescale an image 
The second part of the pre-processing stage is feature extraction. By sending only the 
most relevant features to the algorithm it was possible to decrease redundancy and 
the time necessary to train it increasing the accuracy of the samples, as knowing only 
individual pixels in the image would not provide sufficient information for SOINN.  
To extract those features, the image was divided (Park, et al., 2006) in 4 parts 
separating the top, bottom and upper and lower middle. The sum of each colour in the 
RGB space was then calculated and used to create and histogram of colours (seen 
on figure 6). This highlighted patterns on data and reduced the size (Sun, et al. 2014, 
Zheng, et al. 2012, Gray & Tao, 2008) of the vector input in SOINN and consequently 
the time necessary for training. 
	
Figure 6: Four histograms depicting an image to account for the top, bottom and middle 
parts. The X axis represent the RGB space, which is composed by 256 colours, whilst the Y 
axis the number of times a pixel is portrayed on the image. Each image is then represented 
by a 1024 feature vector 
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Self-Organizing Incremental Neural Network (SOINN) 
The feature vector obtained in the pre-processing stage is sent to SOINN for network 
training, which is significantly fast taking less than 2 seconds to compute 200 sample 
vectors. SOINN is composed from nodes and edges; nodes are vectors once inside 
the network and the edges represent the connections between nodes, creating the 
network structure.  
Initially, the algorithm receives two random signals (vectors) for input which when 
converted to nodes become the basis of the network topology. The remaining signals, 
sent to the algorithm in various iterations, are built around those nodes. Each time a 
signal arrives to the algorithm the 2 closest nodes referred to as winner and second 
winner are calculated. If the new signal is within a predefined distance it is connect to 
the winners, otherwise it will become a new node.  
To allow for noise removal, both nodes and edges have a set time in the network in 
which they need to be removed. However, while the edges are removed without 
exception, nodes are only removed if considered insignificant to the network, 
specifically if it has an insufficient number of connections. The following algorithm 
(figure 7) is based on (Shen & Hasegawa, 2006) explanation of the SOINN network 
structure. 
 
	
Figure 7: Basic algorithm for the Self-Organizing Incremental Neural Network 
 
Distance calculation 
To calculate the distance between two nodes the Euclidean Distance was used, with 
each node representing a vector of features. The distance is given by calculating the 
mean value between the input signal and the existing nodes (Lee, et al., 2012). 
The distance is achieved with the formula: 
𝑑, = (𝑛/ − 𝑠/)*
&
/
 
Where 𝑖 is the position of the value in vector of features, 𝑛 indicates the node and 𝑠 is 
the input signal. 
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Network training 
A set with 180 samples was used during training. The set contained a mixture of 
malicious and normal executable files, 78 of which belonged to the later. The malicious 
data contained 37 trojans, 17 ransomwares, 23 mixed malware types, – backdoor, 
botnet and others – and 25 unclassified samples. Figure 8 shows the malicious 
samples distribution on the training set. 
	
Figure 8: Malware samples distribution according to type 
The algorithm was trained for 1000 iterations in a stationary environment (Shen & 
Hasegawa, 2006) therefore during each iteration a sample was randomly chosen from 
a list containing the feature vectors from the images and then sent to SOINN.  
As it was necessary to keep track of the network accuracy and compare results during 
testing a label was inserted into each sample. However, the label was for testing 
purposes only and had no influence on the network overall structure or classification 
mechanism. 
Data filtering 
Different files were collected from online and other sources and divided according to 
their extensions. During training and testing only files possessing an “.exe” extension 
were used. This was done to limit the scope of the network to a specified group of files. 
Influencing variables 
Tests were conducted to determine which values would provide higher classification 
accuracy. Each test was performed 10 times and then the average figures regarding 
time, accuracy and SOINN output – number of nodes, edges and classes – were 
calculated. 
Image resolution 
Two parts of the algorithm are responsible for its accuracy: image manipulation and 
SOINN structure, therefore the tests were subdivided into two categories respectively. 
In the first group the width and height of the images were altered and their influence 
on the network was analysed. The width of the images was increased using the 
equation 24 where x ≥ 0 since the algorithm uses Hilbert curves (Rose 2001, Jagadish 
1997, Lawder 1999). On the other hand, the height was simply the width multiplied by 
4. 
No significant changes in the accuracy rate were discovered by changing the image 
resolution as seen on figure 9 where the accuracy varies between 81 and 83. 
36%
17%
23%
24%
MALWARE TYPE
Trojan Ransomware Other Unknown
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Figure 9: Image resolution influence in the accuracy rate. The (x) axis represents the 
resolution used in the form width/height. The final values chosen for the image resolution 
were 256/1024 according to the graph. 
 
The performance, however, was affected by the resolution to a higher degree than the 
accuracy. Smaller images needed less time to process than larger images (table 1).  
 
Table 1: Effect of the image resolution effect in the algorithm perfomance 
Width Height Node Age Edge Age Processing Time 
64 256 300 200 < 5 seconds 
128 512 300 200 < 15 seconds 
256 1024 300 200 < 45 seconds 
512 2048 300 200 ≈ 3 minutes 
 
Node and edge removal 
Contrarily to the first group, increasing the time to remove a node or edge from the 
network topology provided better classification results without affecting the system 
performance. 
This time it was possible to see an improvement on the accuracy from the 63% using 
50 and 25 for node and edge respectively reaching a peak of about 90% with the 
values 300 and 200 (figure 10). 
	
Figure 10: Node and edge age influence in the accuracy rate. The (x) axis represents the 
specified “time” before removal from the SOINN network in the form node/edge. In the end, 
the values 300/200 were used. 
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Computing the result 
During testing the nearest neighbour distance of the file being tested is calculated 
against all nodes in the network (Shen & Hasegawa 2006, Shen, et al., 2007); the 
node within smaller distance of the test file is the winner. The category of the file, for 
instance malicious or not, is obtained by returning the class ID of the winner node 
(Yamasaki, et al., 2010). The flowchart at figure 11 describes the steps taken to 
classify the file. 
 
	
Figure 11: Classification of a file flowchart. 
 
The file category, is returned in the “Get Node Class” call and this value is used to 
classify the file as whether it is safe or not. 
Results 
False positive and false negative rate 
The accuracy rate varied between 76% and 89% in a set of 10 tests. The algorithm 
has a higher probability of raising false negatives than positives (figure 12). 
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Figure 12: % of false positives and false negatives raised. The (x) axis indicate the test 
number 
	
Bytes prevalence on malware and software images 
Malware samples are prone to have distinct black (null terminator characters) (black 
areas) and grey areas (control characters) whereas software samples have a more 
even distribution of colours across the image with a minor proportion of null characters. 
Software samples also have higher amounts of red pixels (special symbols and 
characters from the extended ASCII) although more evenly distributed. The relation 
between colours distribution and classification is seen on figure 13. 
	
Figure 13: Average colour frequency and influence on the classification between malware 
and software 
Discussion 
The study suggests that certain patterns in the binary data of a file can assist in 
malware detection although similar characteristics exist between it and normal data.  
One of the main findings of the research was that malware samples contained a higher 
amount of null values which was seen by the volume of black pixels in the images. 
Null values or zero-byte hexadecimals are mostly used to indicate the end of a string 
(Sikorski & Honig 2012, Ligh, et al. 2011, Huseby 2005), for padding, to hide data in 
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the registry (Ligh, et al., 2011) or instructions (Sovarel, et al., 2005), may indicate the 
creation of an unknown file (Dahl, et al., 2013) or in a web-related context as a 
circumvention mechanism (Baloch, 2016) known as null byte injection. Fonseca, et al. 
(2010) explain that by placing a null byte in between two concatenated strings, the first 
being a call to a compromised file, an attacker can bypass the concatenation and 
execute the malicious file. This method is used by hackers to create botnets (Evron, 
et al., 2007). Ovid (2000) and CAPEC Content Team (2017) demonstrate the use of 
null bytes to attack and access data. Everett (2006) shows the exploitation of a 
vulnerability using a null terminator to successfully gain unauthorised access to a 
server. 
Another pattern to note was that some malware samples were mostly covered with 
green pixels or had a higher occurrence of them when comparing to other samples, 
this is uncommon with software samples. Green pixels indicate the use (and abuse) 
of control characters. As it happens with null bytes, attackers make use of control 
characters to exploit vulnerabilities (Dadkhah, et al., 2014) or hide malicious data 
(Wressnegger, et al., 2016). 
Software samples had a more even distribution of colours across the image with a 
higher predominance of red followed closely by blue pixels. The patterns recall the 
image of noise with almost no clustering seen on the picture except for in the top or 
bottom half of it where the majority of distinctive features occur for this category. There 
are, of course, exceptions to this rule which may be the cause of false negatives seen 
in the classification phase. On the other hand, images of malware appear to be more 
dynamic with different patterns or clusters seen across the samples. 
At times the mixture and closeness of pixels with different colours creates the effect of 
a new colour and this is seen mostly with malware samples were purple, orange and 
different shades of green were reproduced. 
Limitations 
The main limitation of the study was the lack of malicious and normal samples and this 
led to restricting the data to executable files only. Most sources are not willing to 
provide malware binaries without a cost involved and gathering reliable samples 
individually from different sources is very time consuming. 
A further limitation was regarding the sample details since for some it was not possible 
to determine the family and type certain malware samples were a part of. Such was 
the result of collecting samples from different sources as these do not store data in the 
same detailed format. 
Conclusion 
The fight against malware has reached a crucial point where the current defence 
systems have become insufficient; familiar threats represent minor risk to the systems 
however newly created binaries are harder to detect creating a vulnerability. 
Thousands of new malicious binaries are registered every day (Bayer, et al., 2010) 
and malware analysts struggle to handle the analysis of such volume. 
This study proposed a new focus for security systems were the detection mechanism 
would be done with the aid of machine learning. The main findings revealed analysts 
can have an insight into the malware structure and discover obfuscated code through 
binary visualisation and this can indeed give them a new perspective to malware, 
malwares presented a higher amount of null values in comparison to software. 
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Furthermore, machine learning is efficient in recognising malware, but more 
importantly it is capable of detecting zero day exploits. 
Further investigation is recommended on improving the feature extraction such that it 
transports increased valuable data to machine learning. Modifying the algorithm to its 
improved version Enhanced Self-Organizing Incremental Neural Network (ESOINN) 
would decrease the number of overlapped classes (Shen, et al., 2007) and increase 
the accuracy rate. 
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